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STATE COURT WITHDRAWAL FROM HABEAS CORPUS
Federal habeas corpus for state prisoners has often brought into conflict two basic constitutional principles: a full and fair state trial for those
accused of crime and a state's prerogative of determining the precise contours of its criminal procedure.1 The efforts of one state prisoner, Don
Anthony White, to obtain release from allegedly unconstitutional imprisonment have caused one state court to attempt a new solution to the conflict.
White was convicted in May, 1960, of murder in the first degree and
sentenced to death. 2 In February, 1964, the Washington Supreme Court
denied his petition for habeas corpus without ordering a hearing.3 White
then petitioned the federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus. His
petition alleged that he was denied counsel and that his confession was
coerced-claims which had not been presented to any Washington state
court.4 The state moved to dismiss, maintaining that White had failed to
exhaust his state remedies. 5 The district court did not dismiss, but rather
1 Brennan, FederalHabeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An Exercise it Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REv. 423, 425 (1961).
2 State v. White, 60 Wash. 2d 551, 374 P.2d 942 (1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
883 (1963). White's primary defense during his jury trial was insanity, in support
of which he introduced considerable psychiatric testimony and his medical history
which disclosed several periods of confinement at state mental institutions. On appeal,
he contended that Washington should abandon the M'Naghten rules and adopt the
insanity test employed in United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961).
See MoDEr. PENAL CODE §4.01 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). He also objected
to the admissibility of certain psychiatric testimony, failure to disqualify a juror and
the sufficiency of the evidence.
White raised as constitutional objections two claims which might later have been
cognizable under habeas corpus: (1) that the admission of two tape recordings of
his confession made by a concealed microphone violated his fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination which, since Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), has
been protected by the fourteenth amendment against abridgement by the states; and
(2) that the Washington statute providing that the penalty for first degree murder
should be life imprisonment, though the jury in its discretion might fix the penalty
at death, was a denial of equal protection, because the jury's decision might be based
on constitutionally improper criteria such as race.
The filing of the petition for certiorari is at least partially explained by the
requirement in Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950), that a state prisoner must
ordinarily seek certiorari as a precondition for applying for federal habeas corpus.
Darr was expressly overruled by Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 435-46 (1963).
a White v. Rhay, 64 Wash. 2d 15, 390 P.2d 535 (1964).
The petition's main
allegations were: (1) for the state to impose the death penalty for an act committed
when the accused was unable to control his behavior is a denial of due process; (2)
because of mental illness at the time of the trial, defendant was unable to assist effectively in his defense; (3) permitting an assistant district attorney sole discretion to
instruct the jury that the state was demanding the death penalty was a denial of equal
protection.
4 See White v. Rhay, 399 P.2d 522, 536-37 (Wash. 1965) (dissenting opinion).
Presumably, the petition also contained those federal allegations denied by the Washington state court in White's first state habeas corpus petition. See note 3 supra.
5399 P.2d at 523. 28 U.S.C. §2254 (1964) provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears
that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the
State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process
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ordered that the case be held in abeyance, subject to petitioner's submission
of a new application to the state supreme court.6
Although seven of the nine members of the Washington Supreme
Court voted for dismissal of White's second application, 7 no more than
four judges could agree upon a rationale.8 Judge Donworth, writing for
four members of the court, asserted that the court lacked jurisdiction of the
subject matter of the proceeding and that, even if jurisdiction were present,
it would not be exercised, since the court would be rendering an advisory
opinion. 9 The finding of a lack of state jurisdiction was based upon the
or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect
the rights of the prisoner.
During the course of the argument on the state's motion, counsel and the court
agreed that White should return to the state court to present his unexhausted allegations. Letter from Stephen C. Way, Assistant Attorney General for the State of
Washington, to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Dec. 14, 1965, on file
in the Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania.
6 The district court was following a procedure which has been, since Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), and Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), increasingly
employed to give states an opportunity to reexamine their post-conviction remedies in
light of recent Supreme Court decisions. See Note, State Post-Conviction Remedies
and Federal Habeas Corpis, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 154, 192-93 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as State Post-Conviction Remedies]. The Ninth Circuit specifically approved this
procedure where a petition such as White's contained both exhausted and unexhausted
claims, noting that state court release of the applicant would result in a dismissal of
the federal petition. Blair v. California, 340 F.2d 741, 745 n.8 (9th Cir. 1965).
In the district court the state also argued that the newly discovered constitutional
violations alleged by White had been waived at trial. White v. Rhay, 399 P.2d 522,
536 (Wash. 1965) (dissenting opinion). Since the state court had not as yet passed
upon the redefinition and expansion of waiver contained in Fay v. Noia, supra at 439,
it is probable that the federal court hoped to obtain a state determination of both the
facts and the question whether the new waiver standard would be employed in state
collateral proceedings. Exactly what standard the Washington courts had employed
prior to Noia is not clear. Washington has passed upon waiver only in the context
of an allegation that the habeas applicant had been denied counsel. In these instances
the formulation applied was whether the applicant had "completely and intelligently"
waived his right. E.g., Friedbauer v. State, 51 Wash. 2d 92, 316 P.2d 117 (1957).
In Wilken v. Squier, 50 Wash. 2d 58, 309 P.2d 746 (1957), however, though the court
employed the competent and intelligent formulation, it cited with approval Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), where waiver was defined as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege," a test applied by Noia.
372 U.S. at 439. Washington courts have not yet decided whether the two formulations are to be considered equivalent.
TWhen a Washington habeas applicant alleges a constitutional violation, the
supreme court, in which all petitions are originally filed, usually enters an order of
reference, directing the petition to the superior court (the state trial court) where
the applicant was convicted for a hearing on the allegations. State Post-Conviction
Remedies 183 n.149. White requested that the order of reference issue, a request
which the state did not oppose. The supreme court's dismissal was sua sponte.
Letter from Stephen C. Way, Assistant Attorney General for the State of Washington, to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Dec. 14, 1965, on file in the
Law Library, University of Pennsylvania.
Biddle
8
judge Donworth, writing the opinion of the court, stated "[A] majority of the
court is of the opinion that . . . this court presently has no jurisdiction of the subject
matter of this proceeding." White v. Rhay, 399 P.2d 522 (Wash. 1965). The alignment of the judges does not support this statement. Judges Hill, Weaver and Ott
joined in Judge Donworth's opinion. Id. at 530. The concurring opinions of both
Judge Hamilton and Judge Hale insist that the court had jurisdiction. Id. at 530, 531.
Chief Judge Rosellini apparently concurred, without reservation, in Judge Hale's
opinion. Id. at 535. The two dissenters, Judges Finley and Hunter, also found that
the court had jurisdiction.
9
Id. at 530.
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premises that jurisdiction once assumed by a federal court is exclusive 10
and that exhaustion of state remedies must be present for the federal court
to assume jurisdiction." This view of the jurisdictional question is, however, plainly wrong and diametrically opposed to that expressed by the
Ninth Circuit in Blair v. California,s in which the court relied upon earlier
decisions declaring that a district court may hold an application for writ
of habeas corpus in abeyance for a reasonable time to allow petitioner to
exhaust his state remedies with regard to a particular issue.' 3 In essence,
Judge Donworth's opinion regarded the jurisdiction of the state court and
o1d. at 524. The court insisted that a federal court has only two alternatives
-either to assume jurisdiction and hold a hearing or to dismiss the petition. Id. at
525. This conclusion is at variance with statements of several federal courts. Cf.
Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d 857, 865-66 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 890 (1945),
where the court stated that a federal judge faced with a habeas corpus petition has
ten alternatives.
Many other district courts, notably in capital cases, have adopted the procedure
employed by the Washington district court-a stay of execution with the court
retaining jurisdiction and permitting the habeas applicant to return to state court.
E.g., Ralph v. Pepersack, 203 F. Supp. 752 (D. Md. 1962); Ex pare Wells, 90 F.
Supp. 855 (N.D. Cal. 1950). In both cases the state courts denied relief on the merits,
never raising a jurisdictional objection. Ralph v. Warden, 230 Md. 616, 185 A.2d
366 (1962); E. parte Wells, 35 Cal. 2d 889, 221 P.2d 947 (1950).
The Washington court buttressed its conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction by

noting that the district court had retained jurisdiction. 399 P.2d at 527. Dismissal
of the petition for this reason is the product of an excess of technicality. Had the

district court merely dismissed the application without prejudice, any jurisdictional
objection would have been obviated.
111d. at 526. The Supreme Court does not regard exhaustion as a jurisdictional
requirement. See Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950); SOoL, FEDERAL HABEAs
CoaPus § 22.2, at 114 (1965); ef. Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 27 (1939) (exhaustion doctrine "not one defining power but one which relates to the appropriate
exercise of power"). One court has explicitly stated: "Section 2254 does not deny
jurisdiction where state remedies have not been exhausted. That section provides
only that the application shall not be 'granted' unless it appears that the state remedies
have been exhausted." Duffy v. Wells, 201 F.2d 503, 504 (9th Cir. 1922), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 861 (1953). (Emphasis added.)
12340 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1965).
Where a state prisoner has not exhausted his state court remedies before
applying for a federal writ of habeas corpus, the district court may usually
either dismiss the application for that reason, or hold itinabeyance while
affording the applicant a reasonable opportunity to exhaust his state remedies
In view of the rather novel exhaustion-of-remedies issue which is
involved inthis case . . . we believe the latter course ispreferable here.
Id. at 745. The "novel" issue inBlair was whether the state court regarded Douglas
v.California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), as retroactive, a question not yet decided by the
state court. Thus, Blair bears a striking analogy to White where the district court
was probably asking the Washington state court to rule upon the applicability of Fay
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). See note 6 supra.
'3 See Thomas v. Teets, 205 F.2d 236 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 910
(1953); Duffy v. Wells, 201 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 861
(1953) ; cf. Lee Fong Fook v. Wixon, 170 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
336 U.S. 914 (1949).
The Blair view is supported by the language of 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1964), providing
in part that: "The court shall . . . dispose of the matter as law and justice require."
Most federal courts have construed this permissive mandate to allow any appropriate
order. See Duffy v. Wells, supra at 505; United States ex rel. LaMarca v. Denno,
159 F. Supp. 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); cf. Application of Wyckoff, 196 F. Supp. 515
(S.D. Miss. 1961).
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that of the federal court as mutually exclusive, never mentioning the state
constitution which is the source of the state court jurisdiction. 4
The conclusion that the state court would be rendering an advisory
opinion is equally puzzling. 15 This determination, based upon a finding that
the state court was being asked whether White had exhausted his state
remedies, 16 ignores the fact that the petition in no manner asked for a
ruling on exhaustion, but requested that the state court entertain White's
claim on the merits.' 7 The opinion discusses the result of the state court's
failure to pass upon the merits of the application,' 8 confusing this issue with
the validity of the constitutional allegations presented by petitioner. Furthermore, it seems clear that had the court reached the merits of White's
petition, its opinion would not have been advisory in the traditional sense. 19
14 WASH. CONST. art. 4, § 4 provides that: "The supreme court shall have original
jurisdiction in habeas corpus . . . ." Judge Hale, concurring, insisted that not only

was jurisdiction conferred by the state constitution, but that it could also be derived

from the "organic law" set forth in the United States Constitution and by inheritance
from the common law. 399 P.2d at 531.
-5
If correct, the logical extension of this position would force any state court
presented with a habeas corpus petition raising federal constitutional questions to
decline to rule upon its merits on the theory that any ruling would constitute an
advisory opinion. The White opinion, at least impliedly, seems to recognize this result
by its citation of In re Horn v. State, 52 Wash. 2d 613, 328 P.2d 159 (1958), to
support its conclusion. 399 P.2d at 528. The applicant in Horn was later granted
the writ by a federal court, though at the time he petitioned the state court, he had
not as yet filed a federal petition. Simply stated, the White opinion seems to imply
that the possibility of federal review of the state court decision renders any state
court determination advisory. See notes 20-21 infra and accompanying text. In an
identical context, no other state court has regarded its opinions as advisory. See
notes 10, 12 supra.
16399 P.2d at 530.
'7 Id. at 528; see notes 6-7 supra. The order of the district court stated explicitly
that petitioner was afforded the opportunity to return to the state court to present
"such issues" as were challenged by the state upon the grounds of failure to exhaust
state remedies. Id. at 523.
18 For federal purposes, the result of the state court's failure to reach the merits
constitutes exhaustion of White's state remedies. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 435
(1963) ; Blair v. California, 340 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1965). After the state court
dismissal in White, the district court entered an order granting White a federal
hearing. Letter from Chief Judge Charles C. Powell, United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington, to the University of PennsylvaniaLaw Review,
Jan. 31, 1966, on file in the Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania.
The state court also stated that "comity" required that the federal court dispose
of the petition. 399 P.2d at 529. It is ironic that the exhaustion doctrine, the very
reason for federal court's disposition, is also founded upon the doctrine of "comity."
Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950) : "As it would be unseemly in our dual
system of government for a federal district court to upset a state court conviction
without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation, the
federal courts sought a means to avoid such collisions. Solution was found in the

doctrine of comity . ..

.

The Washington Supreme Court has never promulgated a definition of what
constitutes an advisory opinion. Those few instances in which the court has spoken
to the problem in no way support its conclusion here. Cooper v. Department of
Institutions, 63 Wash. 2d 722, 388 P.2d 925 (1964) (to answer questions which have
become moot would be an advisory opinion) ; Hutchinson v. Port of Benton, 62 Wash.
2d 451, 383 P.2d 500 (1963) (in declaratory judgment action, decision on legality of
transaction not actually pending would be advisory) ; Grill v. Maydenbauer Bay Yacht
Club, 57 Wash. 2d 800, 359 P.2d 1040 (1961) (where appeal was not from final
judgment, opinion on substantive issues would be advisory).
'9
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One of the crucial characteristics of any nonadvisory opinion is that it have
finality 20 A Washington state court decision treating the merits of an
application for collateral relief would have finality to the extent that any
21
such decision has finality in light of the possibility of federal habeas review.
Stripped of its verbal formulations, the position of a majority of the
Washington court-that jurisdiction would not be exercised even if it
existed-raises major policy questions concerning a state court's role in
administering habeas corpus applications containing claims of federal constitutional violations. The common basis of the opinion of the court and
the two concurring opinions is, quite simply, that the present scope of
federal habeas corpus substantially decreases the necessity of state court
determination of federal issues on collateral attack. Extensive quotation
by the court from both Townsend v. Sain 2 and Fay v. Noia, 2 3 two recent
Supreme Court decisions expanding the scope of federal habeas corpus for
state prisoners, as well as the court's reference to the "futility" of making
any determination on the merits, supports this view. The Washington
court emphasized the plenary powers of the district court to find anew the
facts and the federal law applicable to White's petition,2 5 concluding that
the federal district court alone had "final authority." 28
Exactly what impact the White decision will have on state habeas
corpus petitions in Washington cannot as yet be known. 21 The concurring
20 40 TEXAs L. REv. 1041, 1044 (1962). All other characteristics of a nonadvisory
opinion were present in White: (1) a concrete, contested issue; (2) a definite assertion of a legal right; (3) positive denial of such right; (4) a controversy of such a
nature as to be consonant with the exercise of the judicial function; (5) an issue which
was not academic, theoretical or based upon a contingency; (6) a controversy within
the jurisdiction of the court. Id. at 1044 n.29. See generally Stevens, Advisory
Opinions-PresentStatus and an Evaluation, 34 WASH. L. Rxv. 1 (1959) ; 69 HARv.
L. RLv.
1302 (1956).
21
See note 15 supra. A few state courts, in abstention cases, have felt that a
decision rendered when ultimate power of review remained in a federal court was
advisory. WaiGHT, FEDERax CoURTs § 52, at 171 (1963). Where a federal court
invokes the abstention doctrine, thus permitting the parties to return to state court
to litigate both state and federal issues, and reserves the power to redetermine the
federal issues, it has been argued that the state court has not been presented with a
justiciable controversy, for it cannot determine all issues with finality. United Servs.
Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 396 S.W.2d 855 (Texas 1965); 40 TEXAs L. Rzv. 1041,
1043-44 (1962). It is, however, a "familiar principle that res judicata is inapplicable
in habeas proceedings . . . ." Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 423 (1963). Furthermore,
the state court objection in the habeas situation is solely technical. The district court
could as easily have dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies, precluding any
jurisdictional objection.
22372 U.S. 293 (1963).
23372 U.S. 391 (1963).
24 399 P2d at 528.
In an extensive footnote the court detailed the exhaus25 Id. at 524-25, 527, 530.
tive litigation following People v. Chessman, 35 Cal. 2d 455, 218 P.2d 769 (1950),
399 P.2d at 529 rL3, noting that the proceedings in White were similar to the early
stages of that litigation. Id. at 530. The court's concern with finality is understandable.
In any litigation involving a state prisoner under sentence of death, the prisoner, at
least arguably, will prolong litigation with the hope of gaining either executive clemency or a few more years of life. See quotation in text accompanying note 101 infra.
26 399 P.2d at 530.
27 Since White, the Washington Supreme Court has not passed upon a state
prisoner's petition.
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opinion of Judge Hale intimates that once a state prisoner has appealed his
conviction and presented a single habeas corpus petition, the state court
will afford no further relief.28 In any event it is clear that in light of prior
decisions, of a state statute placing a duty upon the court to determine if
there has been a constitutional violation and of the usual Washington procedure for habeas petitions,29 the decision represents a substantial withdrawal by the Washington court from the habeas corpus field.
The friction created by federal review of state convictions 3 0 and the
all too frequent refusal by state courts to grant full scope to constitutional
imperatives 3 1 is well known. Yet the Washington court's opinion manifests overt antagonism toward neither federal jurisdiction nor the constitutional norms enforced by federal courts; 32 the primary concern of the state
2
8 Id. at 535. Though res judicata is not applicable in habeas proceedings, Fay
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 423 (1963), a court does have power to prevent abusive use
of the writ. See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963). It is possible
that the Washington court is taking the position that, in light of availability of federal
review, more than one habeas application constitutes abuse. It is also possible that
the decision represents a retreat to the void on the face doctrine, i.e., review is confined
to the face of the record to determine if the convicting court had jurisdiction over the
defendant and the subject matter of the action. Under this doctrine, most of the
usual due process claims such as coerced confession, denial of counsel and the like
are not cognizable. See generally State Post-Conviction Remedies 158-59.
29 The evolution of the scope of habeas corpus in Washington has been similar
to that in other states. The state originally followed the void on the face doctrine.
Mason v. Cranor, 42 Wash. 2d 610, 257 P.2d 211, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953) ;
see note 28 supra. An exception to the doctrine had been recognized for cases in
which denial of counsel was alleged. See Thorne v. Callahan, 39 Wash. 2d 43, 234
P.2d 517 (1951).
Statutory reform followed. WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 7.36.140
(1961) provides in part: "In the consideration of any petition for a writ of habeas
corpus by the supreme court . . . if any federal question shall be presented . . . it
shall be the duty of the supreme court to determine in its opinion whether or not
petitioner has been denied a right guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States."
Unlike the experience in other states, see State Post-Conviction Remedies 167-68,
this statute was not judicially emasculated. In response to the statute, the void on
its face doctrine was repudiated-a judgment could be attacked if there was any
constitutional infirmity. Nahl v. Delmore, 49 Wash. 2d 318, 301 P.2d 161 (1956);
Palmer v. Cranor, 45 Wash. 2d 278, 273 P.2d 985 (1954).
Washington courts have usually granted extended hearings on the alleged constitutional violations. E.g., McNear v. Rhay, 398 P.2d 732 (Wash. 1965) ; Thorne v.
Callahan, 39 Wash. 2d 43, 234 P.2d 517 (1951) (four day hearing held, with record
on appeal comprising 431 pages of testimony). The supreme court has construed the
statute to require a determination of the merits of the allegations. McNear v. Rhay,
supra; Pitts v. Rhay, 64 Wash. 2d 481, 392 P.2d 234 (1964).
30 See Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil
Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction To Abort State Court Trial,
113 U. PA. L. REv. 739, 835 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Federal Removal]; Reitz,
Federal Habeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy for State Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L.
Rxv. 461, 524 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Federal Habeas Corpus]. One commentator, sympathetic to the state position, has suggested that one solution to friction
would be repeal of the fourteenth amendment. Baker, Federal Judicial Control of
State Criminal Justice, 22 Mo. L. Rrv. 109, 141 (1957).
31 Former Ohio Chief justice Weygandt, testifying before a congressional committee, stated: "Our penitentiary has as many curbstone lawyers as any other State
Penitentiary, but we have at least a consistent record in Ohio that we have never
allowed one of these writs of habeas corpus." Hearings on HIR. 5649 Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 6, at 13 (1955) ; see Bailey, Federal Habeas Corpus-Old Writ, New Rule: An
Overhaul for State Criminal Justice, 45 B.U.L. REv. 161, 174 (1965).
32 Professor Reitz believes that the basic source of antagonism may not be federal
review but rather hostility toward the constitutional norms enforced by federal courts.
Federal Habeas Corpus 561.
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court appears to be finality, as well as a desire to do all that is possible to
promote that goal. As viewed by the White court, finality can best be
achieved by sufficiently narrowing the scope of state habeas corpus,33 so
that a prisoner may obtain final adjudication of all claims in a federal
34

court.

Constitutional Considerations
Initially, there is some doubt whether a state court can constitutionally
restrict its habeas corpus jurisdiction to exclude certain types of claims or
can refuse to consider habeas corpus petitions.33 A few Supreme Court
cases seem to intimate that state courts have an obligation to provide some
post-conviction process by which constitutional violations can be tested,36
but later decisions indicate that these statements implied only that when a
state court does not provide any appropriate forum for relief, a federal
court may entertain applications for release by state prisoners without re37
quiring prior application to the state court.
The constitutional requirement that the "privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended . . . ," 8 though phrased in absolute terms, is a limitation upon the national government, not upon the
states. 9 If a state court is constitutionally compelled to provide adequate
33The narrowing could be accomplished by any of at least three methods depending on the state's situation: (1) A return to the void on the face doctrine; (2) a
limitation on the number of petitions the court will entertain; (3) a highly restrictive
doctrine of waiver so that any claims not presented in the first petition would be
deemed waived. See note 28 supra.
34 Ifthe Washington courts follow a consistent policy of refusal to hear certain
types of federal claims, there would be no doubt that the habeas applicant could dispense with a state petition. See Whippler v. Balkom, 342 F.2d 388, 390 (5th Cir.
1965) ; note 18 supra.
35 Habeas corpus is used in this sense to denote collateral relief in criminal cases
generally. In Washington, habeas corpus appears to be the only form of collateral
relief.

See WAsHr. REv. CODE ANN. § 7.36.140 (1961).

In states employing other

forms of collateral attack such as coram nobis or delayed appeals in addition to
habeas corpus, the same question would be present if all collateral remedies were judicially restricted.
38
6Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235 (1949); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103,
112-13 (1935). Clearly, by the terms of the supremacy clause of the Constitution,
state courts are bound to enforce constitutional rights at the prisoner's trial. The
inquiry here is whether state courts may so structure the state collateral remedy as
to preclude relief at that stage.
37
jennings v. Illinois, 342 U.S. 104, 111 (1951). Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, cites Mooney v. Holohan, supra note 36, for the proposition that when state
courts fail to give any relief, the road to federal court is open. 342 U.S. at 116. See
Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure,70 IARv. L. REv. 1, 16 (1956).
The older cases intimating that there are situations in which a state is obligated
to provide a post-conviction remedy arose upon consideration of state prisoner applications for federal habeas corpus. In this context, statements concerning a state
court's obligation indicate that nonfulfillment of the obligation means that state remedies have been exhausted, not that a post-conviction remedy is constitutionally compelled. See Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground:
Proposalsfor a Revised Doctrine, 1965 SuPRE E CouRT REV. 187, 210.
38U.S. CosrsT. art. I, § 9.
389
Gasquet v. Lapeyre, 242 U.S. 367 (1917) ; Geach v. Olsen, 211 F.2d 682 (7th
Cir. 1954). This conclusion is based upon the organizational pattern of the Consti-
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collateral relief, it is by force of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The Supreme Court, in Case v. Nebraska,40 granted certiorari
to decide whether there was such a constitutional compulsion. After certiorari was granted, the state legislature enacted a statute providing a postconviction procedure; the Court remanded the cause to the state court for
reconsideration in light of the supervening statute,41 thus avoiding a determination of the issue.42
Petitioner's counsel in Case based his argument on the premise that
the due process clause encompasses not only certain substantive guarantees
of the Bill of Rights, but also the right to be heard in a collateral proceeding if denial of these guarantees is alleged.43 On the facts of Case, due
process may require a state post-conviction hearing. Petitioner had been
convicted on a guilty plea made without assistance of counsel and was thus
deprived of any opportunity to raise constitutional claims. "This is total
deprivation of hearing, total deprivation of process." 44 But that is not to
tution. Article I, § 8 contains the enumerated powers of the national government,
while article I, § 10 contains powers prohibited to the states. Thus, other absolute
§ 9 commands have been held applicable to the national government only. See Morgan's S.S. Co. v. Louisiana Bd. of Trade, 118 U.S. 455, 467 (1886) ; Munn v. Illinois,
94 U.S. 113, 135 (1876). In Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 406 (1963), the Supreme
Court discussed the suspension clause solely in terms of national power.
Even if the Supreme Court decided that the § 9 guarantee against suspension of
the writ was to be applied to the states through incorporation into the fourteenth
amendment due process clause, the Court would be applying a much attenuated protection. At common law, the writ was employed primarily to test the legality of
executive and pretrial detentions. The only post-conviction function of the writ as
understood by the framers was to verify the formal jurisdiction of the convicting
court Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 MIcH. L. REv.
451, 464-68 (1966). See generally Collings, Habeas Corpus for Convicts-Constitutional Right or Legislative Grace?, 40 CALIF. L. REv. 335, 341-61 (1952). Incorporating this concept of the writ embodied in § 9 would be of little aid to a petitioner,
for due process claims are not cognizable under the restrictive common law jurisdictional view. See note 28 supra.
40381 U.S. 336 (1965). In the state court proceedings in Case the prisoner
alleged that he had been coerced into waiving both counsel and a preliminary hearing.
The Nebraska Supreme Court recognized that these allegations stated a prima facie
case of constitutional violation, but stated: "Habeas corpus is not available to discharge
a prisoner from a sentence of penal servitude if the court imposing it had jurisdiction
of the offense and of the person charged with the crime, and the sentence was within
the power of the court." Case v. State, 177 Neb. 404, 412, 129 N.W.2d 107, 112 (1964).
41381 U.S. at 337. Both Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Clark, in separate
concurring opinions, discussed the advisability of states broadening the scope of their
collateral relief. In neither opinion did the two justices offer an indication of their
position on the due process issue.
42
The identical issue was posed by the petitioner but not resolved in Smith v.
Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 713-14 (1961). In Touw'send, the Court insisted that "we do
not mean to imply that the state courts are required to hold hearings and make findings
which satisfy . . . [the federal] standard, because such hearings are governed to a
large extent by state law." Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313 n.9 (1963).
43
Brief for Petitioner, pp. 20-25, Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965). To
support this contention petitioner cited Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235 (1949), and
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935). See notes 36-37 .supra and accompanying
text.
44 Unpublished Address by Professor Anthony G. Amsterdam, Seventeenth Annual
Conference of Chief Justices, August 5, 1965 [hereinafter cited as Amsterdam Address].
Petitioner's brief also cited two noncriminal cases, General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209
U.S. 211 (1908), and Ward v. Board of County Comm'rs, 253 U.S. 17 (1920). In
General Oil the state had collected an allegedly unconstitutional tax. An action for

1966]

HABEAS CORPUS

say that a post-conviction hearing is required where there has been some
process-where the applicant has raised his claims in the original proceedings; where, assisted by counsel,45 he has had full opportunity to raise
his claims but has failed to do so; or even where petitioner has entered a
guilty plea with the aid of counsel. 46
Even if due process encompasses the right to be heard in all of the
above situations, it does not follow that in the collateral relief context the
state must afford a hearing. Federal habeas corpus jurisdiction creates an
"utterly unique relationship" between state and federal courts,47 for state
court denial of collateral relief leads, at the prisoner's option, to full reconsideration by a federal trial court. "[E] lsewhere in the federal system the
state courts' decisions are accepted as final, subject only to possible review in
the Supreme Court ....
48 So long as federal trial courts are free to
entertain habeas corpus applications, the right to be heard is given full
protection, and state court denial of the post-conviction application does not
"

result in abridgment of the right. 49 One federal circuit court has recognized
a refund was denied by the state court on the theory that it had no jurisdiction to
entertain a suit against the state or state officials. Ward involved a similar factual
situation. In both cases the Supreme Court was primarily concerned with whether
the state court's view of its jurisdiction was an adequate state ground sufficient to
prevent the Supreme Court from reaching the merits of the tax. Though there are
statements in both cases that refusal to reach the merits of the allegedly unconstitutional tax was a denial of due process, the opinions are somewhat ambiguous, for
there are also statements that retention of the tax moneys themselves under an unconstitutional statute would be a due process denial. At best, these two cases stand
for the proposition that a state may not act unconstitutionally and then deny any
opportunity for a hearing on the merits of its action.
45After Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), it is clear that the state
must furnish counsel to an indigent defendant accused of a felony. In a factual situation such as that found in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923)-where mob
pressure and domination so interfere with the course of justice that the accused cannot
receive a fair trial-even though counsel is present, there may be a total deprivation
of process.
46Amsterdam Address 9. It is often said that there is no constitutional right
to appeal from a criminal conviction. E.g., Mooneyham v. Kansas, 339 F.2d 209 (10th
Cir. 1964); Horton v. Bomar, 335 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1964) (dictum). In great
measure appeal itself is a post-conviction remedy, for, where allegations have been
raised at trial, it gives the prisoner a second opportunity to present these constitutional
allegations. In such a situation if appeal is not constitutionally compelled it would
seem, a fortiori that neither are other post-conviction procedures. Furthermore, "a
consistent line of decisions establishes that a state court's determination that a federal
claimant has chosen an inappropriate remedy under state procedure-in this situation
post-conviction relief rather than assertion at trial-is adequate to sustain a judgment
of dismissal." Sandalow, supra note 37, at 211.
47 Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74
IHAv. L. REv. 1315, 1324 (1961).
8
As
1d. at 1330.
49
According to Professors Hart and Wechsler, "what process is due always depends upon the circumstances, and the due process clause is always flexible enough
to take the circumstances into account." Hart, The Power of Congress To Limit
the Jurisdictionof Federal Courts: An Exercise inDialectic, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1362,
1393 (1953), reprinted in HART & WECHsLEm, THE FEDERAI COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYsrM 333 (1953). Both federal and state courts may hear claims arising under
the Constitution. It would appear that Congress could deprive all federal courts of
jurisdiction to entertain post-conviction applications filed by state prisoners without
causing a due process deprivation, so long as the state courts were still available to
hear these claims. Id. at 1401-02; cf. Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872).
(Tarble might have been decided differently had federal courts been unable to enter-
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that an applicant has a right to post-conviction process which is protected
by federal jurisdiction:
It was specially important that this [federal court hearing] be
. . .[held] because there had been no taking of testimony on
the relevant circumstances of the trial before any . . . state

court in which the conduct of relator's trial had been challenged
as essentially unfair. We emphasize this because we believe it is a
virtue of our system of justice, as implemented by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, that it does not send a
convicted person to his death without according him one full opportunity to prove charges of unfair trial which are not patently
frivolous. The important thing here is that relator has now had
that chance.50
With the federal interest in the vindication of constitutional rights adequately protected by the availability of federal habeas corpus, the basic
interest served by a Supreme Court insistence that states provide corrective process would be supervision of state criminal procedures.51 It would
be improper for the Court to compel a state to protect a state interest that
the state court no longer wishes to protect.
Practical considerations may enter into the formulation of constitutional doctrines52 and in this case counsel against the promulgation of a
tain habeas petitions by federal prisoners.)
The converse should be equally true.
All state courts could refuse to hear post-conviction applications, so long as federal
district courts were still available to adjudicate these claims.
Determination of the effect of a limitation upon the jurisdiction of federal courts
to entertain applications by state prisoners on state court obligation to provide collateral relief must await the event. Attempts to limit federal jurisdiction in habeas
corpus have been made but defeated, usually in the Senate. See generally Pollak,
Proposals To Curtail Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: Collateral Attack
on the Great Writ, 66 YALE L.J. 50 (1956). The Supreme Court has suggested that
restriction of the present scope of federal habeas corpus for federal prisoners might
be unconstitutional. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1963). In Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 406 n.15 (1963), the Court declined to express a similar view
on the scope of habeas for state prisoners.
50 United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 224 F.2d 504, 506 (3d Cir. 1955), aff'd,
351 U.S. 454 (1956) ; accord, Rodgers v. Turner, 178 F. Supp. 225 (D. Utah 1959).
An analogous situation provoked a similar reaction by another federal circuit
court. In Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd on other
grounds sib nom. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), petitioners were
German civilians held under military custody in Germany after conviction for war
crimes. The district court had dismissed the petition upon the holding of Ahrens v.
Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948), that a district court could not issue the writ for a prisoner
beyond its jurisdiction. The circuit court reversed the dismissal on the ground that
habeas corpus jurisdiction must constitutionally fall to some federal court. The court
noted that state courts, under the doctrine of Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397
(1872), could not issue the writ for persons held under the authority of the United
States. Eisentrager v. Forrestal, supra at 966. Apparently, had the state courts not
been disabled from issuing the writ, federal jurisdiction would not have been necessary.
51 Sandalow, supra note 37, at 213. Such insistence would decrease neither the
number of federal petitions nor federal-state friction. See notes 73-78, 82-87 infra
and 5accompanying text
2 Practical considerations do influence constitutional doctrines. In Mississippi
v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867), for example, the Court declared that it
would be powerless to enforce an injunction against the President and that this factor
must impinge upon its decision.
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doctrine requiring adequate state collateral relief. Cognizant of the already
great federal-state antagonism which federal habeas corpus jurisdiction
has produced, the Supreme Court should decide that availability of federal
habeas corpus renders unnecessary insistence that a state court expand the
scope of its collateral relief.63 By dismissing without prejudice to filing a
federal petition, rather than remanding to the state court with a demand
that the application be considered upon its merits, the Supreme Court
would avoid a stark conflict.-4 If, after remand, the state court did not
grant a hearing on the application, the Court would probably be faced with
two choices: release the applicant though his contentions had not yet been
found meritorious or direct the petitioner to apply to the proper federal
district court.5 5 Clearly, the Court would choose the latter alternative.
The additional litigation created by the original remand to the state court
could be avoided by simply dismissing without prejudice to a federal
petition.
Numerous courses are open to a state court wishing to restrict the
scope of state collateral relief, each having its own consequences.5 6 The
method chosen by a state court will most likely be more the product of
history than of logic since the scope of choices available to any given court
will be limited by the peculiar doctrinal development of that state's collateral relief. At least two of these courses-a restriction of jurisdiction or
a strict definition of waiver-appear, however, to be constitutionally permissible.
53 See Note, Effect of Federal Constitution in Requiring State Post-Conviction
Remedies, 53 COLUm. L. REv. 1143, 1145-46 (1953).
54 Occasionally remand to the state court will be ordered, usually when the Court
recognizes that there is some possibility that the state court might grant relief. See,
e.g., Jennings v. Illinois, 342 U.S. 104 (1951).
65 The Court might attempt to dispose of the petition on the merits, but this would
involve a determination based on an inadequate factual record. Occasionally the
Supreme Court has ordered that a state either afford the applicant a hearing or release
him. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) ; Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534
(1961). In each of these instances appeal was from denial of the writ by a federal
circuit court and not from a state court denial. Furthermore, the dispositive issue in
each case was legal rather than factual-Jackson settled the proper procedure and
Rogers the proper test for determining the voluntariness of a confession. Thus, the
necessity for an adequate record as to the issues of fact was not present.
The possibility that a state court would ignore the Court's directions upon remand
is not imaginary. In Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945), the Court remanded to
the state court to hold a hearing on the alleged denial of counsel. The state court
on remand reiterated that habeas corpus was not available and refused to hold a
hearing. Hawk v. Olson, 146 Neb. 875, 22 N.W.2d 136 (1946).
It also appears that some states are not willing voluntarily to broaden their collateral remedies. In Krauter v. Maxwell, 3 Ohio St. 2d 142, 209 N.E.2d 571 (1965),
a habeas corpus petition based upon illegality of arrest and denial of counsel was
denied, the court finding that such a claim was not cognizable in habeas corpus. The
dissent contended that Case indicated that states would be "well advised" to provide
adequate post-conviction remedies. Id. at 153, 209 N.E.2d at 578.
56 See State Post-Conviction Remedies 157-63 for a comprehensive discussion of
the various techniques state courts have employed to deny a hearing on due process
allegations. For example, if petitioner alleged that his confession admitted at trial
was coerced, the court might refuse to hear this claim on the grounds that: (1) this
specific claim is not cognizable collaterally; (2) evidentiary claims generally are not
raisable in collateral proceedings; (3) claims dependent upon facts outside the record
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The state court could insist that its habeas remedy reaches only errors
vitiating the jurisdiction of the trial court, thus effectively precluding most
due process claims. 51 Support for such insistence can be found both in
decisions declaring that state jurisdictional requirements do not raise constitutional questions 58 and the experience of state attempts to refuse enforcement of federal statutes. 59 State courts must enforce federal claims
unless they have an otherwise "valid excuse." 1o In Testa v. Katt,61 the
Supreme Court held that if a state court has "jurisdiction adequate and
appropriate under established local law" to adjudicate the controversy, it
must do so. The implication of Testa appears to be that a state does not
have to enforce federal rights if it does not enforce analogous forum-created
rights. 6 2 Simply stated, lack of state court jurisdiction over state claims
is a "valid excuse" for refusal to entertain similar federal claims.
are not subject to collateral attack; (4) claims raisable at trial are not raisable
collaterally; or (5) only "jurisdictional" claims are cognizable under collateral attack.
Of course, this list is not exhaustive.
57
This was the position taken by the state in Case v. State, 177 Neb. 404, 129
N.W.2d 107 (1964). See generally State Post-Conviction Remedies 157-61.
Perhaps an allegation of denial of counsel could not be barred by this procedure.
In Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467 (1938), the Supreme Court stated that counsel
for an accused was an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court conviction.
This statement, however, is explained by the fact that in 1938 the Court was still
thinking of habeas corpus in terms of jurisdictional defects. The Court today has
rejected any requirement that the constitutional defect go to the jurisdiction of the
trial court before the violation is cognizable under habeas corpus. See Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391, 399-414 (1963) ; Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942). In
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the decision applying the sixth amendment's guarantee of counsel to the states, no mention was made of jurisdictional
questions.
58 See, e.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 120 (1945) ; Central Union Tel. Co.
v. City of Edwardsville, 269 U.S. 190, 195 (1925).
59 See generally Cullison, State Courts, State Law, and Concurrent Jurisdiction
of Federal
Questions, 48 IowA L. REv. 230, 235-40 (1963).
6
o Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377, 388 (1929).
461330
U.S. 386, 394 (1947). Testa did not face the question whether Congress
could constitutionally force state courts to create jurisdiction to hear federal claims.
The congressional mandate required only that Emergency Price Control Act claims
"may be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction ....
"
56 Stat 34 (1942).
(Emphasis added.)
2 Most commentators have found this to be the most probable reading of Testa.
See Cullison, supra note 59, at 239; Note, State Enforcement of Federally Created
Rights, 73 HARv. L. Rxv. 1551, 1554-55 (1960); Note, Utilization of State Courts
To Enforce Federal Penal and Criminal Statutes: Development in Judicial Federalism,
60 HARv. L. Rxv. 966, 971 (1947). Professor Hart has stated:
But whether the states are under a constitutional obligation to provide courts
of competent jurisdiction for the enforcement of federal rights of action, if
no such courts otherwise exist, and, if so, how the obligation can be effective,
remains uncertain. The uncertainty illustrates again the great fact of political
science that ultimate questions often do not have to be faced in successful
collaborative living.
Hart, The Relations between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLum. L. REv. 489, 507-08
(1954).
The problem has usually been approached in terms of congressional power under
the necessary and proper clause to compel state courts to hear the federal claim. See
WRIGHT, FEDERAL CoURTs § 45, at 149 (1963).
Most of the litigation arose under
the Federal Employer's Liability Act which requires state courts to exercise concurrent jurisdiction. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§51-60 (1964).
Thus, the contention could be made that Congress may compel state courts to hear
federal claims, but that the Supreme Court, absent a clear direction from Congress,
should not.
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The state could also adopt the position that any constitutional claims
which could have been but were not raised in the original proceedings shall
be deemed conclusively waived.6
It does not appear that the federal
standard of waiver applicable to federal habeas corpus 6 is a constitutional
requirement for the states. The Supreme Court, for example, recently
remanded a case to the state supreme court to determine if federal waiver
standards would be adopted by the state. The Court insisted: "[W]e
neither hold nor even remotely imply that the State must forgo [sic]
insistence on its procedural requirements if it finds no waiver." 6
The state court would have to structure with care the technique it
employs to restrict the scope of state collateral relief. The doctrine is
well established that if a state court usually entertains actions of a certain
type under state jurisdiction, the court may not decline to entertain a
similar federal claim on grounds which amount to discrimination against
rights created by federal law. 66 So long as the state court consistently
holds that certain types of claims, whether created by state or federal
law, do not fall within the jurisdictional scope of the state collateral remedy,
an even-handed application of any restriction would be constitutional.
As a practical matter, a state court should have little problem in
avoiding any discriminatory application of the method it adopts for restricting state collateral remedies. Such discrimination would occur only
if the state court insisted upon enforcing certain types of state rights but
refused to enforce similar federal guarantees. Four situations are possible:
(1) the state constitutional or statutory provision is interpreted less favorably to the prisoner than the federal constitutional provision; (2) the state
provision is interpreted identically to the federal right; (3) the state provision is interpreted more favorably to the petitioner than its federal counterpart; 67 and (4) the state provision has no federal parallel. In situations
See State Post-CoinictionRemedies 164-65.
64 See note 6 supra. Waiver is here used not in the usual sense of whether the
right itself was waived, a standard which is part of the right itself and thus a constitutional necessity, but rather whether the opportunity to litigate an asserted denial
of the right was waived by failure to do so in a prior proceeding.
85 Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 452 (1965). The Court then added that
such a finding would merely result in a federal district court determining waiver by
federal standards. Ibid. Had the Court deemed federal waiver standards constitutional, it is doubtful that the remand would have been phrased in permissive terms.
Furthermore, in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 428 (1963), the Court recognized that:
"A defendant by committing a procedural default may be debarred from challenging
his conviction in the state courts even on federal constitutional grounds." Defendant
could not be so debarred if the federal waiver standard were a constitutional requirement.
66 See McKnett v. St Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230, 233-34 (1934) ; Mondou
v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 223 U.S. 1, 56-57 (1912). See generally Sandalow,
supra note 37, at 203-07; Hart, The Power of Congress To Limit the Jurisdiction of
Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1362, 1397-1402 (1953).
Though these cases involve federal statutes, the doctrine would appear to be equally
applicable to federal constitutional provisions.
67 Several states have due process clauses worded similarly to the fourteenth
amendment. In the area of economic due process a few of these states have retained
greater control over state legislation than the federal due process clause requires.
63
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(1) and (2) discrimination would have little utility for the state court, as
it grants to the petitioner no more than he can achieve by his federal application. A state judge would realize that restriction of the state remedy will
not promote finality, for the applicant can obtain release in a federal court.
In situation (3) the state court would have no reason to discriminate, for
the state guarantee, fully and fairly applied, would subsume any protection
offered by the federal Constitution. Only in situation (4) would the state
court be compelled to abandon a state guarantee, for the restrictions would
preclude its consideration and the prisoner would be unable to obtain federal relief on the nonparallel provision.68
Certainly, the Washington court's reaction would not be constitutionally interdicted. Petitioner had counsel and two prior opportunities-the
original proceedings and one post-conviction application-to raise constitutional claims. This is all the process which petitioner is due.
Practical Considerations
The Supreme Court has recognized that the expanded scope accorded
federal habeas corpus would be a source of irritation between federal and
state courts, but it apparently believes that, if prodded sufficiently, state
courts or legislatures would reform both the substance and the procedure
of their collateral remedies so that all constitutional claims would receive
an adequate, albeit reluctant, reception.69 Most commentators have echoed
the Supreme Court's hope, 70 yet the Washington court has refused to
accept the gauntlet; rather than reform, it has chosen retreat.
It might at first seem that the Washington court has thus unwarrantedly renounced any responsibility to adjudicate federal claims, unnecessarily placed a burden upon federal courts and violated the cooperative
spirit of the federal system. Much of this feeling would seem to stem
from the assumption that the duality of review occasioned by federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction implies state consideration of constitutional allegations.
See BAaa'T, BRUTON & HoNNoLD, CONSTrru ioNAL LAW 962-63 (2d ed. 1963). For
example, the Supreme Court in Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421

(1952), upheld a statute allowing an employee to leave his employment without loss
of pay on election day for the purpose of voting. In Heingaertner v. Benjamin Elec.
Mfg. Co., 6 Ill. 2d 152, 128 N.E.2d 691 (1955), however, a state supreme court refused
to follow Day-Brite and invalidated a similar law under the due process clause of the

state constitution.
68 Those states desiring to restrict collateral relief would probably feel little loss
in foregoing the enforcement of the state provision.
69 See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 452-53 (1965) ; Brennan, Some Aspects
of Federalismn, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 945, 957-58 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Aspects of
Federalism].
Some state courts appear to be responding favorably. See State Post-Conviction
Remedies 193-96.
TO E.g., Bailey, supra note 31, at 208; Meador, Accommodating State Criminal
Procedure aid Federal Post-Goniction Review, 50 A.B.A.J. 928, 929 (1964) ; Reitz,
Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74 Hv. L. REv.
1315, 1348 (1961). Only Professor Bator seems to have recognized as a substantial
possibility that state reform might not be forthcoming. Bator, Finality in Criminal
Law and FederalHabeas Corpus for State Prisoners,76 H1{v. L. REv. 441, 523 (1963).
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Pragmatically, however, there is much to commend the Washington
position.
The exhaustion doctrine, which in the collateral relief context is simply
a reflection of the desire that state courts should consider habeas applications before federal review is to be permitted, is often justified on the theory
that it promotes state concern for constitutional rights.7 ' Even if a state
court narrows the scope of its habeas relief so that in most cases resort to
the state court would be unavailing, the necessary conclusion is not that
state disrespect for constitutional norms will be fostered. The state would
still retain a substantial interest in prevention of constitutional violations
during the criminal trial proceeding for, if violations are not prevented, the
state conviction will be subject to federal collateral review, the state will be
put to the expense and risks of retrial and finality of the judgment will be
delayed. Professor Meador has suggested that states should accept the
opportunity offered by the Supreme Court to revise their collateral remedies so that they may maintain control over their criminal processes and
administration. 72 Recent Supreme Court habeas corpus opinions imply
that if the state is to avoid collateral review by a federal court, its postconviction remedy must be coextensive with federal habeas corpus.7 Furthermore, however untenable the position may be, much of the state hostility
toward federal habeas corpus is directed at the substantive doctrines of
due process. 74 Faced with a forced submission to federally conceived procedures for litigating judicially unpopular federal rights, a state court may
well feel that standards imposed from above do not, in essence, allow for any
real retention of control.7 5 Finally, state court withdrawal might lead to a
reduction of federal-state friction. Professor Amsterdam has noted that
the diversity and federal question jurisdiction of the federal district
courts, though an intrusion upon state courts, do not prompt state animosity.7 6

He attributes this phenomenon to the fact that these cases

are "clearly, cleanly, and completely excluded from the state courts' ken
...
,, 77 Federal habeas corpus, on the other hand, presents a constant source of irritation by violating provinces state courts have traditionally regarded as exclusive. Though state court withdrawal smacks
of an ostrich-like philosophy, it would mean that a state judge was not
being reversed-simply because he never ruled upon the question. The
result-federal court issuance of the writ-would be identical in either
case, but state judges would not feel the sting of reversal of their denials
71 See, e.g., 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1303, 1304 (1965).
72 Meador, mipra note 70, at 929; accord, State Post-Conviction Remedies 195-96.
73 See, e.g., Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 344-47 (1965) ; Henry v. Mississippi,
379 U.S. 443, 952-53 (1965) ; Aspects of Federalimn 957-58; Meador, sipra note 70,
at 929.
74
See note 32 supra.
75
Compare the position of Chief Judge Desmond of New York in Desmond,
Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Court Convictions-Proposalsfor Reform,
9 UTAH
L. Rxv. 18 (1964).
7
e Federal Renmval 835. But cf. Williams, The Role of Federal Courts in Di13 KAN. L. Rv. 375, 387-88 (1965).
versity
7 7 Cases Involving Mineral Resources,
Federal Removal 835.
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of the writ, especially if the federal court had based its determination upon
allegations which had not been presented to the state court in the original
8
state proceeding
Professor Amsterdam suggests that economical deployment of the
state's judicial resources may impel a state court decision to deny collateral attack. Where petitioner has already raised and received full consideration of his allegations during trial and appeal, entertaining a postconviction application presenting similar questions results in wasteful
duplication of judicial time and effort, entails expense if the convict must be
brought before the court for a hearing, increases the possibility that prisoners will file applications to gain a trip to court and disturbs the finality
79
If
of the conviction with accompanying ill effects upon rehabilitation.
petitioner has received an unobstructed opportunity to raise constitutional
claims yet has not done so, these considerations must be balanced against
state court desire to insure integrity of its criminal processes by requiring
that all claims be heard at least once at the state level.80 Again, the state
court could properly insist that the importance of finality dictates that the
petition be denied.8 State court withdrawal would not necessarily have a detrimental impact upon federal court administration of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. Assertions that expanded scope of state habeas corpus would create
a significant decrease in the number of federal petitions misconceive the
nature of the typical applicant's motives and misinterpret the experience of
recent years. Prisoners, spurred on by a sense of grievance,8 2 by the
expanding contours of due process 8 3 and by an inability to evaluate the
merits of their petitions, are filing habeas corpus applications after state
court denials almost as a matter of course.84 The resultant markedly increasing rate of federal habeas corpus applications from state prisoners 85
78A possible countervailing consideration should be mentioned. State police and
prosecutors might more liberally administer constitutional guarantees if they had been
decreed by their state courts; a state court rebuke might have more impact than that
of a federal court However, both police and prosecutors are primarily interested in
convictions and it is likely that they would soon conclude that disregard of an accused's
rights would result in reversal of the conviction by a federal court. This should
provide
sufficient stimulus to insure compliance with the Constitution.
7
) Amsterdam Address 19-21 ; see text accompanying note 101 infra.
80 Amsterdam Address 20, 23-24.
81Id. at 24.
8 United States ex rel. Walker v. LaVallee, 224 F. Supp. 661, 662 (N.D.N.Y.
1963).
83 Pope, Suggestions for Lessening the Burden of Frivolous Applications, 33
F.R.D.
409, 413-14 (1962).
84
Bailey, Federal Habeas Corpus-Old Writ, New Role: An Overhaul for State
Criminal Justice, 45 B.U.L. REv. 161, 205 (1965).
85
No. of Successful
No. of Petitions
%
Petitions
Filed
Successful

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964

4

9
17
34
46

871

984
1,249
1,904
3,531

0.46

0.91
1.36
1.78

1.30
The data for the number of successful petitions was obtained by the author through
examination of all reported opinions for those years. The number of unreported
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has been further aggravated by a relaxation of prison rules allowing expanded access to legal materials.8 6 Thus in 1960, 871 petitions were filed
by state prisoners and four, or 0.46 per cent, were reported as successful
while in 1964, 3,531 were filed and forty-six, or 1.30 per cent, were reported as successful.8 7 This data tends to show that even if state courts,
utilizing an expanded habeas remedy, had granted all meritorious claims,
the number of federal petitions would not have significantly decreased;
furthermore, since prisoners do not seem to be discouraged by the great
probability that their petitions will be denied, it is not likely a state court
denial on the merits would convince the habeas applicant that his allegations
would receive equally unfavorable federal treatment.
Perhaps, as envisioned by Townsend,s8 a full and fair state court hearing on each petition would render unnecessary a federal court hearing.
Yet the Supreme Court's language in Townsend itself vitiates this expectation. Not only did the Court detail six circumstances making a hearing
by a federal court mandatory,8 9 it left to district court discretion the power
to hold a full evidential hearing in any case.90 The Court noted that "it is
the typical, not the rare, case in which constitutional claims turn upon the
resolution of contested factual issues," 91 placed considerable emphasis upon
demeanor evidence 92 and insisted that a hearing must be held if all the
relevant facts were not "reliably" found. 93 The stress laid upon proper
release cases cannot be determined.

Even assuming that the number of unreported

release cases is double or even triple the number of those reported, a significant
change in the percentage of petitions successful would not result. The data for
the number of petitions filed was found in DmEcrol OF ADmINISTRAVE OFiC
or U.S. CoURTs ANN. REP., 1960-table C3, at 235; 1961-table C2, at 239;
1962-table C2, at 197; 1963-table C2, at 199; 1964-table C2, at 219. The Administrative Office compiles its data on the basis of a fiscal year ending in June; the
number of successful petitions was calculated on a calendar year. Thus, though the
data is not technically comparable, it does show the relevant trend. In fiscal 1965,
4,666 habeas corpus petitions were filed. Letter from James A. McCafferty, Chief,
Research and Evaluation Branch, Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Jan. 21, 1966, on file in the Biddle
Law Library, University of Pennsylvania. The number of writs granted in 1965, as
of reported opinions published by Jan. 15, 1966, was 43, or 0.92% of the petitions filed.
88 Shaefer, Federalimn and State Crimw Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1, 21-22
(1956). Many prison officials do not discourage the preparation of petitions, regarding
this activity as therapeutic since it tends to promote good prison behavior. Goodman,
Use and Abuse of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 7 F.R.D. 313, 316 (1947).
8
7 See note 85 supra.
88
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 318 (1963).
The Supreme Court made a
district court hearing mandatory under the following circumstances:
If (1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record
as a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was
not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial
allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears
that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair
fact hearing.
Id. at 313.
89 See note 88 stpra.
90 372 U.S. at 318.
91 Id. at 312.
92 Id. at 322.
3
9 Id. at 313.
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factual development by a state court combined with the known predilections
of local judges and juries to distort constitutional norms has led one commentator to conclude: "I am more than a little skeptical concerning the
number of state prosecutions for arguably fourteenth-amendment protected
activity in which an appropriately solicitous federal district judge could
conclude with some assurance that the state trial was 'full and fair.' " 04
Despite the discretion given in Townsend to district judges to refuse to
grant an evidentiary hearing when state court procedures are acceptable,
an evidentiary hearing should be "required on every well-pleaded federal
contention raising a factual dispute." 95
Both district and circuit judges have concluded that, in practice, the
effect of Townsend will be to compel a district judge to hold a hearing in
most cases. Faced with frequent statements by the Supreme Court that
it will make an independent examination of the facts to insure that constitutional criteria have been properly applied,9 6 the chances of reversal of a
district court denial are heightened if a district court accepts state court
findings.9 7 This factor, combined with the broad discretion granted by
Townsend, prompted one circuit judge to admonish: "If you have any
doubt on the disposition of a post conviction application for relief, grant a
hearing." 98 A prisoner who alleges a deprivation of his constitutional
rights will ultimately be granted a hearing somewhere unless he has deliberately by-passed state procedures or by deliberate personal choice has
waived the right.99 Since there is little probability that an adequate state
hearing will meaningfully decrease either the number of hearings a federal
judge will be required to hold or the number of federal petitions filed, in
terms of economy of the total system of federal-state habeas corpus state
court withdrawal at least dispenses with state hearing and consideration of
the merits of each application, a task which most federal judges will have
to duplicate.
Though a state judge's concept of finality has usually dictated that he
advocate repeal of federal collateral review, 10 0 the inevitability of federal
94
Federal Removal 834. Though directed toward civil rights prosecutions, Professor Amsterdam's observation seems applicable to other criminal prosecutions, especially those involving defendants who are members of minority or disfavored socioeconomic groups.
95
1d. at 841 n.193.
96 See, e.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33-34 (1963).
97 See Pope, Further Developments in the Field of Frivolous Applications. Is
Proliferation Probable?,33 F.R.D. 423, 429 (1963).
98 Breitenstein, Remarks on Recent Post Conviction Decisions, 33 F.R.D. 434,
445 (1963). Senior Circuit Judge Pope notes: "[T]he more often the federal judge
digs into facts for himself, without merely accepting the state court's findings, the
more frequently we shall find . . . [any constitutional violation], the more apt we
are to learn the truth in the rare meritorious case." Pope, Suggestions for Lessening
the Burden of Frivolous Applications, 33 F.R.D. 409, 419 (1962). For a similar
reaction by a district judge, see Caffrey, The Impact of the Towntsend and Noia Cases
on Federal District Judges, 33 F.R.D. 446, 449-51 (1963).
99 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438-40 (1963).
00
o See Desmond, supra note 75, at 20.

HABEAS CORPUS
review may prompt the conclusion that finality can best be served, within
the bounds of the existing system, by withdrawal. Professor Bator, admittedly thinking in terms of the intrusions occasioned by federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction, offers a powerful plea that our judicial system be
structured to satisfy this need:
The first step in achieving that aim [rehabilitation] may be a realization by the convict that he is justly subject to sanction . . . ;
and a process of reeducation cannot, perhaps, even begin if we
make sure that the cardinal moral predicate is missing, if society
itself continuously tells the convict that he may not be justly
subject to reeducation and treatment in the first place. The idea
of just condemnation lies at the heart of the criminal law, and we
should not lightly create processes which implicitly belie its
possibility.' 0 '
This interest can be equally well served if the state court, by conclusively
demonstrating that an applicant's remedies are exhausted, removes the
necessity for application to the state court and thus permits direct recourse
to the federal system.
The wisdom of the decision reached by the Supreme Court in Townsend is not here in question. Its conclusion that a federal district court,
when disposing of a habeas corpus application, has the power and often the
duty to hold a hearing on factual questions already determined in a state
court may be sound. Townsend, however, is the pivot of the total federalstate collateral relief system; as the frequency of federal hearings increases,
the incentive for state court reform correspondingly decreases. The tenor
of Townsend-from the viewpoint of a state judge-is negative. The six
mandatory situations coupled with the district judge's discretion to hold a
hearing in any event leaves the state judge with a feeling of futility; 102 a
belief that even his best efforts will not necessarily forestall a federal hearing. 0 3 The Supreme Court should not expect to achieve the best of both
worlds-a system in which state courts hold extensive hearings yet then
accept the probability of repetition of this process by a federal court.
Ideally, state court determination of the merits of each habeas application under procedures giving full scope to all constitutional allegations
might obviate the need for federal review in most, if not all, cases. But
101 Bator, vtpra note 70, at 452.
3o2

See note 24 supra and accompanying text.

103 This problem has been implicitly recognized by the Judicial Conference of the

United States. In a bill drafted by the habeas corpus committee, an amendment to
§ 2254 was proposed to remove the negative impact of Towmsend. The amendment
provides that factual findings of a state judge, if contained in a written opinion "or
other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to be correct . .. .
Report of the Committee on Habeas Corpus, Judicial Conference of the United States
16 (Sept., 1965), on file in the Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania. This
proposal is apparently designed to increase the incentive to hold state hearings by
creating a presumption in favor of their validity.
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when confronted with the necessities of day to day administration of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, the inability of the system to discourage
prisoner applications or the hearings these applications inevitably require
and the state court's overriding interest in finality, state court withdrawal
seems to combine practical efficiency with maximum protection of constitutional rights. Withdrawal, certainly, is a more sensible course than continued state recalcitrance-it serves both the interests of finality and efficient judicial administration with, hopefully, a concomitant decrease in
federal-state antagonism.

